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Federalism and the Rise of
Renewable Energy: Preserving
State and Local Voices in the
Green Energy Revolution
Daniel A. Lyons†
The rise of renewable energy has disrupted the traditional
regulatory structure governing electricity. Unlike traditional fossil fuel
power plants, wind and solar facilities are geographically constrained:
they exist where the wind blows and the sun shines. Large-scale
renewable energy is more likely to flow interstate, from resource-rich
prairie and Southwestern states to energy-hungry population centers
elsewhere. The difficulties of coordinating interstate electricity policies
have led some to call for greater preemption of the states’ traditional
duties as chief regulators of the electricity industry. But while
preemption would eliminate some state-level roadblocks to interstate
cooperation, it would sacrifice many of the benefits of local knowledge
and experimentation in a diverse and innovative new marketplace.
This paper examines the benefits of a cooperative federalism
approach to electricity regulation. The challenges facing renewable
energy are regional in scope, and there is value in preserving state and
local voices in policymaking decisions. It examines three aspects of the
renewable energy debate—siting generation facilities, building
transmission lines, and adopting demand-side renewable energy
standards—and, for each, explores governance structures that would
promote greater regional cooperation without sacrificing the benefits
of decentralized government.
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Introduction
America is in the midst of a quiet electricity revolution. Spurred
by federal policies promoting energy diversity1 and state initiatives to
decrease reliance on fossil fuels,2 companies have begun investing
significantly in renewable electricity generation. From 2000 to 2012,
wind power capacity in the United States increased twenty-five fold
to over 60,000 megawatts,3 enough to power more than fourteen
million homes.4 Solar electricity capacity has quadrupled in the past
four years alone, reaching the 10,000 megawatt milestone in 2013.5
America currently generates approximately thirteen percent of its
total electricity from renewable sources,6 and the Department of
1.

See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95617, 92 Stat. 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)) (requiring
utilities to interconnect with non-utility-owned electricity generation
facilities); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat.
2776 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 (2012)) (establishing renewable
energy production tax credit and incentive payments for new renewable
electricity sold on the wholesale market).

2.

As discussed in greater depth below, thirty-nine states and the District
of Columbia have adopted some form of a renewable portfolio standard
(RPS), which requires utilities to purchase a certain percentage of their
electricity from renewable sources or to offset a portion of their fossilfuel-based electricity through renewable energy credits (REC). See infra
Part I.C. The Department of Energy tracks state renewable portfolio
requirements. See Rules, Regulations, & Policies for Renewable Energy,
Database for State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Feb. 21,
2014) (providing “a snapshot of government and utility rules,
regulations and policies that promote renewables in the United States”).

3.

U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Installed Wind Capacity, Energy.gov,
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that installed wind capacity was
2,472 megawatts as of December 31, 1999, and 60,005 megawatts as of
December 31, 2012).

4.

See Jason P. Brown, The Cycles of Wind Power Development, Main
Street Economist, no. 3, 2013, at 1, 1, available at http://www.
kansascityfed.org/publicat/mse/MSE_0313.pdf (“By the end of 2012,
estimated total capacity was about 60,000 MW, enough to power
between 14 million and 24 million homes annually.”).

5.

US Reaches Milestone of 10 Gigawatt Solar Photovoltaic Capacity,
Solarbuzz (July 9, 2013), http://www.solarbuzz.com/news/recentfindings/us-reaches-milestone-10-gigawatt-solar-photovoltaic-capacityaccording-npd-sola (“Solar PV installations in the US have seen
significant growth since the start of 2010; 83% of the 10 GW were
completed within the past 14 quarters.”).

6.

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Power Monthly with
Data for November 2013 12 (2014), [hereinafter Data for
November 2013] (showing summary statistics for net electricity
generation from January through October 2013, which exhibit
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Energy expects that share to grow.7 It estimates that one-third of all
new capacity built in the next quarter-century will be from renewable
sources.8
Renewable energy differs from more traditional electricity sources
in several important ways. Perhaps most obviously, renewable energy
generates less carbon dioxide and air pollutants than traditional coal
or natural gas-fired power plants, which makes it an attractive
alternative for environmentalists.9 And fuel costs are negligible: while
traditional electricity often depends on fossil fuels whose prices vary
in the market, wind and sunshine are free. But those fuel sources are
intermittent. Renewable facilities produce energy only when the wind
“hydroelectric conventional” and “renewable sources excluding
hydroelectric” totals that make up 12.94% of the United States’ total
electricity generation).
7.

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2013 6
(2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).
pdf. The report models six potential cases for a renewable share of the
2040 generation market, which range from a low of fourteen percent to a
high of thirty-one percent. The base case projection of sixteen percent
assumes that generation will grow as technology matures and costs
decline, which make them more economical in later years of generation.
Falling natural gas prices can negatively impact renewable generation,
as it will lead companies to substitute natural gas-fired generation
instead (driving the fourteen percent scenario). Id. at 5. Alternatively, a
carbon tax will likely increase the share of generation from renewable
sources, as it will raise the cost of fossil fuel generation (leading to
estimates between twenty-three and thirty-one percent share for
renewable energy, depending on the magnitude of the carbon tax). Id.
Note that these figures include hydroelectric power as a renewable
resource.

8.

Id. at 72. Interestingly, although hydroelectric power comprises a
significant portion of today’s renewable energy, capacity growth in this
sector is expected to be negligible. Almost all new renewable
construction is expected to be solar, wind, and, to a lesser extent,
biomass or geothermal energy. Id. at 74. As discussed in greater depth
in Part II, the discrepancy between significant growth in renewable
capacity and lesser growth in renewable share of total electricity
generation stems from the fact that renewable resources typically have a
lower capacity factor than traditional energy sources. Wind and solar
power operate intermittently, so they do not generate maximum
electricity for as long a period of time as traditional coal or gas-fired
generators. See, e.g., Bob Bellemare, What is a Megawatt?,
Commodities Now (Mar. 2010), http://www.commodities-now.com/
reports/power-and-energy/2136-what-is-a-megawatt.html. (noting that
coal plants operate at a capacity of sixty percent or higher while wind
sites and solar generators operate at a capacity of forty percent or less).

9.

See David B. Spence, Regulation, Climate Change, and the Electric
Grid, 3 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 267, 270 (2012) (noting
that the decrease in GHG emissions associated with wind and solar
energy sources “may represent an environmental improvement”).
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blows or the sun shines, which poses challenges for grid regulators.
And significantly, renewable electricity must be generated where its
fuel is found. Unlike fossil fuel or nuclear power plants, which can be
located virtually anywhere in the country, wind turbines can only be
built in windy locations and large-scale solar projects are most feasible
in hot, arid environments. Renewable energy thus requires significant
infrastructure investment to bring electricity from generators
to consumers.
Though renewable energy will not displace fossil fuels as
American’s primary electricity source anytime soon, its growth
threatens the stability of the traditional regulatory model governing
electricity. Like many New Deal–era administrative statutes, the
Federal Power Act divided regulatory authority neatly between the
federal government, which regulates interstate electricity sales, and
state regulators, which regulate intrastate activity.10 Historically this
division favored state regulators, as electricity was primarily an
intrastate industry: vertically integrated utilities built power plants
near population centers then constructed transmission lines to carry
electricity to the local community and distribution networks to deliver
power to consumers.11 Most utilities operated within a state-granted
intrastate service area and were overseen primarily by state public
utility commissions.12
But the deregulation of electricity generation, and the rise of
renewable energy in particular, have threatened the states’ primacy.
Improvements in transmission technology and federal policies
promoting independent (non-utility-owned) power production have
created a competitive wholesale power market allowing for more
interstate electricity sales.13 In the renewable power sector, a
significant portion of electricity is likely to flow interstate. Renewable
energy potential is highest in the Midwest and southwestern states,
where wind and sunshine are abundant. But it is likely to be
consumed by load centers several hundred miles away.14 The existing
10.

See Ari Peskoe, Note, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National
Goals in the Electricity Industry, 18 Mo. Envtl. L & Pol’y Rev. 209,
220–21 (2011) (discussing the addition of federal regulatory authority
meant to supplement present state regulation).

11.

See id. at 217 (noting that early on “the electricity industry was
vertically integrated with a single company producing, transmitting and
distributing electricity to end users”).

12.

See id. at 212–16 (discussing regulation in the early 20th century by
state public utility commissions); Richard J. Pierce Jr. & Ernest
Gellhorn, Regulated Industries in a Nutshell 364 (4th ed. 1999).

13.

See infra Part I.B.

14.

See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality—Finding
Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 Wm. & Mary Evntl. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 635, 666 (2008) (explaining that successful wind sites are
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transmission network is insufficient to transport large quantities of
renewable electricity to load centers, or to manage the variability
created by intermittent renewable generation. And many states eager
to promote “clean energy” will lack the ability to do so without
cooperation from neighbors whose geography is more amenable to
renewable generation.
With some states poised to become net exporters of renewable
energy, and others net importers, some policymakers have questioned
whether states should continue to serve as chief regulators of the
electricity industry. Since 1978, Congress and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken numerous steps to
increase federal regulation of the electricity market, some of which
have proven more successful than others. Citing the interstate nature
of renewable energy markets, the national benefits of reduced fossil
fuel consumption, and state and local barriers that inhibit renewables
growth, more voices are calling for the federal government to displace
the states and assume the primary role over the electricity industry.
But these calls for federal preemption overlook the ongoing
interests of state and local governments in shaping the renewable
energy sector. Many key policy questions facing the renewable power
sector—where to build new renewable generation facilities, how to
modify and extend the transmission network, and how to calibrate the
appropriate fuel mix between renewable power and more traditional
electricity sources—are regional in scope. While there is
unquestionably a federal interest in preventing parochial state
interests from jeopardizing broader regional benefits, there is a
concomitant state interest in leveraging local knowledge and
identifying instances where regional diversity makes a uniform federal
policy inappropriate or inefficient. Especially in an industry as
dynamic as electricity generation, it is important to preserve space for
experimentation and innovation that could be crowded out by broad
federal mandates.
This paper explores the ongoing role that state and local officials
should play in the renewable energy sector. The dual federalism
approach embodied by the Federal Power Act offers a false dichotomy
between state and federal regulation. Cooperative federalism provides
the potential for greater dialogue between state and local officials, and
allows for more regional experimentation within broad federal
confines. Cooperative federalism has been instrumental in helping
policymakers manage transitions in many other regulated industries,
and those insights can help inform regulation of the increasingly
dynamic and complex electricity industry. While a complete overview
of the electricity industry is beyond the scope of this article, the
typically located in remote places such as the Upper Midwest and often
“great distances from the closest population source”).
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discussion focuses on three key policy issues implicated by renewable
energy: siting renewable generation facilities, managing and expanding
the transmission grid, and determining appropriate renewables
demand. For each issue, the article applies federalism principles to
identify the key interests involved and explores structures that would
promote regional cooperation where necessary without sacrificing the
benefits of decentralized government.

I.

Electricity Regulation and the Rise
of Renewable Generation
A.

The Traditional Regulated Utility Model

Analysts typically separate the American electricity industry into
four segments: fuel, power generation, transmission, and distribution.15
Within the generation segment, most of America’s power plants run
on fossil fuels. Two-thirds of all electricity generated in the United
States in 2012 came from either coal or natural gas–fired power
plants.16 Nuclear power accounted for another nineteen percent, while
renewable energy made up twelve percent of America’s electricity in
2012 and has gained share slightly in 2013.17 Once the electricity is
generated, it travels over high-voltage transmission lines to a utility
substation, where transformers convert the power to low-voltage
electricity and distribution lines deliver it to customers.18
Traditionally, state public utility commissions have regulated the
vast majority of this industry. As Richard Pierce and Ernest Gellhorn
explain, “[u]ntil 1978, virtually all electricity service was provided on
a fully bundled basis by one of hundreds of integrated firms. The
15.

See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1805 (2012).

16.

See Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=
electricity_in_the_united_states#tab2 (last updated Apr. 10, 2013)
(noting thirty-seven percent of total electricity generation from coal, and
thirty percent from natural gas).

17.

Id. Hydroelectric power comprised seven percent of total electricity
generation in 2012, with five percent from other renewable resources
including wind, solar, and biomass energy. Id. Additional installation of
wind and solar energy in 2013 accounts for the year-over-year growth in
the renewables sector. See Data for November 2013, supra note 6, at
tbl.1.1.

18.

Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1805–06. Transmission lines include
lines carrying power at 115 kilovolts and above. By comparison,
standard distribution lines deliver energy at 34.5 kilovolts or less.
Regulatory Assistance Project, Electricity Regulation in the
US: A Guide 65 (2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/645.
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integrated utility generated its own electricity, transmitted that
electricity across its high voltage lines, and distributed the electricity
to all customers in its service territory.”19
Typically, a utility received a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from state regulators, which granted it the exclusive legal
right to provide electric service within a territory. State regulators
oversaw most aspects of the utility’s operations, including facilities
construction, rate regulation, and customer service.
The vertical integration of intrastate utility operations was not an
accident; rather, it was a deliberate choice by policymakers to tame
what economists considered a natural monopoly industry. Like other
infrastructure industries, electricity providers must incur substantial
fixed (and sunk) costs to bring electricity into a service area. But once
the infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of extending service to
any given customer is trivial. This means that the average cost per
customer falls with each additional customer added to the utility’s
grid. As a result, regulators quickly determined that customers were
better served by a single utility that built one grid and spread the
costs across the entire population, rather than multiple utilities that
built unnecessarily duplicative infrastructures at higher per-customer
costs.20 In 1907, Wisconsin passed the first state public utility law,21
which represented a grand bargain between the utility and the state.22
In Wisconsin and states that followed, each investor-owned utility
was chartered as the exclusive provider of electricity within a given
service area, which insulated the utility from potentially destructive
competition and reduced the financial risk of building electricity
infrastructure. In exchange, utilities were obligated to provide reliable
service throughout the service area on nondiscriminatory terms and
were subject to rate regulation that guaranteed a reasonable rate of
return without abusing their monopoly status.23 By 1920, almost every
19.

Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 364.

20.

Very early in the history of the electricity industry, some cities
encouraged competition among electricity providers. See, e.g., Peskoe,
supra note 10, at 212–13 (discussing early efforts to promote electricity
competition in Chicago). But these experiments typically ended in
consolidation, which left customers effectively with one choice for
electricity while wasting substantial capital on duplicative infrastructure
that proved ultimately to be unnecessary. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The
Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. &
Econ. 269, 274 (1978).

21.

Peskoe, supra note 10, at 212.

22.

Electricity regulation began at the municipal level, but municipal
franchises were widely seen as corrupt, and even honest city regulators
were no match for a well-organized utility. See id. at 213.

23.

See id. at 213–14 (noting that rates were to be based on a fair valuation
of property); Spence, supra note 9, at 274–75 (noting that in return for
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state had a similar law governing the electricity industry. And when
utilities threatened to outgrow their state regulators, the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 193524 limited the corporate structure
of public utilities in a fashion that effectively confined most utilities
to a single state.25
The federal government played a much smaller role in electricity
regulation. The Federal Water Power Act of 192026 created a Federal
Power Commission, which built and operated hydroelectric dams on
navigable waters, a traditionally federal resource.27 After the Supreme
Court ruled that states could not regulate electricity sales across state
lines,28 Congress in 1935 passed the Federal Power Act,29 which gave
the Federal Power Commission authority over interstate electricity
transmission and interstate wholesale power sales.30 The language of
the Federal Power Act seemed broad, granting the Commission wideranging authority to enforce “just and reasonable rates” on interstate
power and to remedy “unduly discriminatory or preferential”
practices.31 But Congress explained that the statute was meant merely
to fill the gap exposed by the Court’s decision. The Act explicitly
stated that the Commission’s authority would “extend only to those
matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”32
their status as a monopoly, utilities “were obligated to provide reliable
service on a nondiscriminatory basis”).
24.

Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000)) (repealed 2005).

25.

Peskoe, supra note 10, at 218–19.

26.

Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 791 (2012)).

27.

§ 4(d), 41 Stat. at 1065.

28.

Rhode Island Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83, 90 (1927). The case involved an agreement in which a Rhode
Island electric utility agreed to sell a small portion of its electricity to a
Massachusetts electricity utility for resale to customers in that state. Id.
at 84. The Rhode Island utility later sought to increase the rate under
the contract due to increasing generation costs. Id. at 85. The Rhode
Island Public Utility Commission approved the rate increase, but the
Massachusetts utility successfully argued in court that the Commission’s
order was an unconstitutional direct burden on interstate commerce. Id.
at 90.

29.

Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824 (2012)).

30.

§ 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48.

31.

§§ 205–06, 49 Stat. at 851–52.

32.

§ 201(a), 49 Stat. at 847. This savings clause was typical in
New Deal–era statutes that allocated authority between the federal
government and the states. For example, the Communications Act of
1934 explicitly provided that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed
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The Federal Power Act thus created a clear division of authority
over electricity issues between the federal government and the states.
The Federal Power Commission oversaw interstate electricity sales.33
But because federal securities laws largely prohibited electricity
utilities from serving end-user customers in more than one state, the
Commission’s responsibility was generally limited to the occasional
interstate sale of surplus power between utilities. The state public
utility commissions served as the primary guardians of the public
interest. In the words of one commentator, state public utility
commissions served as the “primary administrators of the ‘regulatory
compact’ between utilities, customers, and investors.”34
B.

Federal Deregulation of the Generation Market and
the Birth of Renewable Energy

The decline of the traditional regulatory model, and the rise of
renewable energy, both have their origins in the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,35 commonly known as “PURPA.”
Passed as a reaction to the 1970s energy crisis, PURPA sought to
diversify America’s electric power industry and improve reliability by
encouraging non-utility companies to generate their own electricity for
consumption and sale.36 PURPA provided special rights for small
to apply or to give the [Federal Communications] Commission
jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges, classifications, practices,
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service.” Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1065 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2012)). States lobbied to include these savings
provisions to avoid federal agencies from using their power over
interstate activity to reach intrastate activities that had an effect on
interstate commerce, as the Interstate Commerce Commission had
successfully done in the Shreveport Rate Case. See Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that
the federal government could exert power over intrastate carriers);
Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should
Control the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 383, 386–90 (2010) (discussing state attempts to limit the
scope of intrastate federal regulation).
33.

The New Deal established several federal agencies that boosted federal
electricity generation, such as the Rural Electrification Administration
and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Peskoe, supra note 10, at 222. By
1950, the federal government generated twelve percent of all electricity
in the United States. In addition, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave
the Atomic Energy Commission authority to license nuclear power
plants, in conjunction with state officials. And the Clean Air Act
permitted the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate air
pollution from power plants. Id.

34.

Id. at 222.

35.

Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)).

36.

§§ 2, 210, 92 Stat. at 3119, 3144.

1628

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy

power production facilities that generated electricity from renewable
resources and cogeneration facilities that produced electricity in
tandem with another form of thermal energy. Dubbed “qualifying
facilities,” these entities had the right under PURPA to sell their
surplus electricity at preferential rates to their electrical utilities.37
PURPA also gave the Commission, now renamed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, authority to order an electrical utility to
connect qualifying facilities to the utility’s transmission system, so the
facility could sell its surplus electricity elsewhere.38
PURPA was a prominent part of a larger movement in the 1970s
to stimulate competition in markets traditionally considered natural
monopolies. Within the electricity sector, PURPA built upon the
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,39 which upheld an antitrust claim against a utility that refused
to allow an independent electricity producer use of its transmission
lines to sell electricity to a customer within the utility’s service area.40
Otter Tail suggested that antitrust law may prohibit state-granted
monopolies from wielding market power in ways that inhibit the
development of competition. In the telecommunications industry,
which similarly consisted of state-granted local monopolies that
provided telephone service at just and reasonable rates, independent
upstarts like MCI and Sprint sued the Bell telephone monopoly,
alleging that Bell used its control over local telephone networks to
thwart competition for long-distance calls.41 The resulting antitrust
investigation resulted in the landmark 1984 consent decree that broke
up the Bell system and ultimately led to a competitive
telephone industry.42
PURPA helped jumpstart the development of an independent
renewable electricity industry in the 1980s. From 1980 to 1989, 1100
37.

§ 210(c), 92 Stat. at 3144–45 (stating that the rates “shall be just and
reasonable” and “shall not discriminate against the qualifying
cogenerators”).

38.

§ 202, 92 Stat. at 3135.

39.

410 U.S. 366 (1973).

40.

Id. at 377. The customer in question was a municipal utility that
provided power to the city but lay completely within the defendant’s
service area and thus was dependent on the defendant’s transmission
network to receive any power the municipality did not generate itself.
Id. at 371.

41.

MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
MCI’s complaint included counts of “monopolization, attempt to
monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize—all under section 2 of the
Sherman Act—and conspiracy in restraint of trade—under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.” Id. at 1092.

42.

United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226 (D.D.C. 1982). The
decree was entered in 1982 and took effect in 1984.
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megawatts of wind capacity were added to the grid, compared to only
17 megawatts in the 1970s.43 Geothermal energy (which uses the
Earth’s natural heat to generate electricity) saw 2135 megawatts
installed in the 1980s, compared to 550 megawatts in the 1970s.44
Wood-fueled power experienced additions of 1523 megawatts in the
1980s, compared to 212 megawatts in the 1970s.45 Solar and other
renewable generation grew as well. While renewable generation was
still a small portion of total installed capacity in 1989, it had gained a
toehold and was the fastest-growing segment of the generation
market. Notably, most of this growth occurred in only a handful of
states.46 PURPA allowed state regulators to oversee the terms of sales
agreements between qualifying facilities and traditional utilities, and
some states, most notably California, interpreted this mandate more
aggressively than others.47
The growth of independent electricity generators created
significant pressure for regulators to mandate nondiscriminatory
access to utility-owned transmission networks.48 Although independent
power generators were slowly bringing competition to the wholesale
electricity market, many thought this competition was retarded by
the utilities’ continued monopoly over the transmission segment.
Vertically integrated utilities had little incentive to provide
transmission facilities to independent generators who competed
against the utility’s own electricity generation facilities. Without
transmission, independent generators’ opportunities to sell electricity
were limited. FERC regulators agreed: although the Commission
lacked authority under PURPA to order open access outright,
throughout the 1980s it used its merger approval authority
opportunistically to attach conditions requiring post-merger entities to
provide transmission services to independent electricity generators.49
The Energy Policy Act of 199250 expanded access to the
transmission grid. The Act granted FERC greater authority to require
43.

See Peskoe, supra note 10, at 230 (analyzing data reported in U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., 2009 Electric Generator Report, eia.gov,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html (follow 2009
“ZIP” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)).

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 231.

47.

Id.

48.

Spence, supra note 9, at 276.

49.

See Joseph T. Kelliher, Pushing the Envelope: Development of Federal
Electric Transmission Access Policy, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 543, 553 n.43,
606 (1992) (discussing FERC’s indirect use of its merger authority).

50.

Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201
(2012)).
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utilities to provide transmission services to independent electricity
producers (an arrangement known as “wheeling”).51 But this authority
was incomplete: FERC could only order wheeling of specific utilities
upon the request of an electricity generator, and only upon a finding
that wheeling would serve the public interest.52 The 1992 Act also
made it easier for independent electricity generators to enter the
market and introduced tax credits for construction of certain
renewable resources.53
Ultimately, FERC imposed an open access requirement on the
entire transmission system, not because of a new grant of authority
from Congress, but by reinterpreting its original statutory mandate.
As noted above, section 205 of the Federal Power Act requires
utilities to sell interstate power and transmission at “just and
reasonable rates” and refrain from “undue prejudice or
disadvantage.”54 Section 206 allows the Commission to remedy
“unduly discriminatory or preferential” practices.55 Drawing upon this
statutory language, the Commission issued Order 888 in 1996, which
requires all public utilities that transmit electricity in interstate
commerce to file nondiscriminatory open access transmission tariffs
with the Commission.56 Under Order 888, independent producers of
renewable energy could now purchase transmission services from
utilities at the same rate the utility charged itself, to sell its electricity
to a wider audience of potential customers.
C.

State Growth in Demand for Renewable Energy

As federal policy was making it easier to supply renewable
electricity to the market, state renewable portfolio standards
stimulated demand for the product. Iowa adopted the nation’s first
renewable portfolio standard in 1983, when the state passed an
Alternative Energy Production law requiring its two investor-owned
utilities to contract for a combined total of 105 megawatts of
51.

§ 721, 106 Stat. at 2915. PURPA had given FERC limited authority to
order wheeling by a recalcitrant utility, but because of the conditions
Congress placed on that authority, FERC never exercised it. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text.

52.

§ 721, 106 Stat. at 2915 (requiring certain rates and conditions for
issuing an order for a wholesale transmission service).

53.

Id. (granting certain benefits to entities that control and deliver electric
energy to consumers).

54.

16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), (b) (2012).

55.

§ 824e(a).

56.

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 21, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).
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generation from renewable energy resources,57 an amount equal to a
mere two percent of the state’s overall energy consumption.58 Since
then, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted
renewable portfolio standards, alternative energy portfolios, or
voluntary goals to encourage growth in renewable energy generation.59
State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) typically require a
specified percentage of annual electricity sales to be generated from
renewable resources. The percentage varies significantly from state to
state. For example, Minnesota requires that twenty-five percent of its
total electricity consumption come from renewable sources by 2025.60
California has been even more aggressive, mandating twenty-five
percent by 2016 and thirty-three percent by 2020.61 At the other end
of the spectrum, North Carolina mandates only 12.5 percent by
2021.62 Virginia has targeted fifteen percent by 2025, but its goal is
merely voluntary.63
The definition of “renewable energy” also varies among states.
Every state gives credit for electricity generated from wind,
photovoltaic solar, biomass, and methane, and all but one include
thermal solar generation.64 But only twenty-nine states count
geothermal energy toward the total, and only twenty-three include
ocean and tidal energy.65 States are also divided regarding whether to
consider large hydroelectric power as part of their overall goal. While
hydroelectric generation is emission-free, some argue that large
hydroelectric dams have other deleterious effects on the environment
57.

Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable
Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation, 31 Energy J. 133,
134 (2010).

58.

Christine Real de Azua, The Future of Wind Energy, 14 Tul. Envtl.
L.J. 485, 501 (2001).

59.

See Database for St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
supra note 2.

60.

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 216B.1691(2a) (West Supp. 2014).

61.

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.30(c)(2) (West Supp. 2014).

62.

See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, Database for St.
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (Mar. 2013), http://
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf (giving an
overview of the renewable portfolio standard policies of states and
territories).

63.

See Virginia: Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency,
Database for St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency
(Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm? Incentive_Code=VA10R.

64.

Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS,
42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1376 (2010).

65.

Id.
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and therefore should not be encouraged through RPS standards.66
States also vary regarding which electricity utilities are subject to the
requirement. Some states place renewable portfolio restrictions only
on investor-owned utilities, while others include alternative electricity
distributors such as municipal utilities and rural electric
cooperatives.67 These limitations affect the overall impact of the
renewable portfolio standard: Illinois, for example, has a somewhat
aggressive goal of twenty-five percent by 2025,68 but the standard only
applies to one-third of total electricity sales in the state.69
In some, but not all states, utilities subject to the standard may
meet the law’s requirements by purchasing renewable energy credits
(RECs) from out-of-state renewable suppliers. RECs are tradable
certificates meant to represent the environmental benefit of renewable
energy. A renewable energy generator that participates in REC
markets may issue a REC for each megawatt of renewable energy
produced, which virtually decouples the environmental benefit from
the electricity itself. Utilities needing to meet resource portfolio
standards in REC-friendly states may purchase RECs in lieu of
generating or purchasing renewable electricity. Once the REC is
unbundled, the renewable energy generator remains free to sell the
underlying megawatt in the electricity market, but cannot market it
as a renewable resource. Because some states produce renewable
energy more efficiently than others, one state’s renewable portfolio
standard can lead a utility to purchase RECs from renewable
generators in other states and thus fund the development of
renewable resources throughout a region.70

II. Challenges to Renewable Energy Development
As states increase their demand for renewable electricity,
policymakers and industry participants will inevitably come under
greater pressure to expand the renewable power sector. To do so, they
must confront several obstacles that inhibit the growth of renewable
energy. These obstacles include local opposition to new electricity
generation facilities, lack of transmission infrastructure to carry
66.

See id. at 1377–78 (noting, for example, that Arizona counts only
projects with 10 megawatts of capacity or less, while California counts
up to 30 megawatts if the project does not impact “instream beneficial
use” and Maine counts projects up to 100 megawatts).

67.

Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1810 (observing differing renewable
portfolio restrictions between states and municipalities).

68.

20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/I–75 (West Supp. 2013).

69.

Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1810.

70.

See id. at 1810–11 (noting how the RECs in neighboring states can
drive the “need for additional regional transmission projects”).
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renewable electricity to load centers, and grid instability fostered by
the intermittent nature of many renewable resources.
A.

Local Opposition to Renewable Generation Facilities

Companies seeking to construct new renewable power generating
facilities often find their efforts thwarted by local opposition. This
phenomenon is particularly prominent when considering wind
turbines, which often attract significant community criticism.
Although some communities welcome the investment, jobs, and lease
payments that wind farms bring to a local community, these projects
often face significant hurdles and fierce opposition. Ashira Ostrow
quotes one energy siting consultant as remarking that “wind energy is
fast becoming ‘the mother of all NIMBY wars.’”71
Often the local residents’ concerns are primarily aesthetic. Many
wind farms are located in mostly rural areas. In many cases, the
proposed wind turbines, which can measure up to twenty-five stories
tall, would dominate a landscape that contains no structures more
imposing than a grain silo.72 Community activists resent the intrusion
on what would otherwise be open rural, agricultural landscapes.
Others focus on the fact that spoiling scenic views (such as the ocean
views of Nantucket Sound off Cape Cod) can impact local property
values and tourist revenue.73
Perhaps surprisingly, environmental groups sometimes oppose
wind farms, because of the potential risk of bird strikes and other
wildlife harm. The Center for Biological Diversity unsuccessfully sued
the owners of wind turbines in the Altamont Pass Wind Resource
Area, one of California’s oldest and largest wind farms, alleging the
wind farms killed birds in violation of the public trust doctrine.74
More recently, Duke Energy Corporation pleaded guilty and paid a $1
million fine in late 2013 to settle a Justice Department suit alleging

71.

Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes,
48 Harv. J. on Legis. 289, 336 (2011) (citations omitted). NIMBY,
short for “Not In My Backyard,” is a common term used to define local
opposition to a proposed facility.

72.

Tom Stanton, Put It There! Wind Energy & Wind-Park Siting
and Zoning Best Practices and Guidance for States 1 (2012),
available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/FINAL%20FINAL%
20NRRI_Wind_Siting_Jan12-03.pdf.

73.

See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism
and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 Hofstra
L. Rev. 1049, 1074–75 (2009) (observing the concern of some residents
that installing wind farms will have a negative effect on tourism and
property value).

74.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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that a Wyoming wind farm killed several eagles and other birds
protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.75
Other concerns sound in nuisance or public health and safety.
Residents sometimes complain about the potential noise of wind
turbines, although Patricia Salkin and Ashira Ostrow note that noise
levels, like bird strikes, have decreased in recent years with industry
experience and technological advancements.76 In Falmouth,
Massachusetts, several residents allege in a lawsuit that local turbines
have given them “wind turbine syndrome,” a controversial diagnosis
marked by headaches, vertigo, and insomnia.77 Other complaints
include safety threats from falling blades or ice thrown from blades,
construction-related damage to nearby roads, and interference with
microwaves and telecommunications signals.78
Of course, community opposition is common to many new
electricity generation projects, not just wind. Anti-nuclear activists
fought a high-profile battle against nuclear power in the 1970s and
1980s,79 and again following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.80 Similarly,
traditional fossil fuel plants are often subject to challenge because of
the air pollution they generate. PJM Interconnection, which manages
portions of the electricity grid in the northeastern United States,
noted that “increasingly contentious local opposition to siting” of new
generation facilities made it unlikely that new generation capacity

75.

See Dina Capiello, Guilty Plea in Bird Deaths at Wind Farms a First,
Associated Press, Nov. 23, 2013, available at http://news.
yahoo.com/guilty-plea-bird-deaths-wind-farms-first-081651963-finance.html (detailing the conditions under which Duke Energy Corp.
pleaded guilty).

76.

See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1072–73 (claiming that
advancing technology has reduced wildlife deaths to an “anomaly” and
has positively affected noise levels) (citation omitted).

77.

See Susan Donaldson James, “Wind Turbine Syndrome” Blamed for
Mysterious Symptoms in Cape Cod Town, ABC News, Oct. 21, 2013,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wind-turbine-syndrome-blamedmysterious-symptoms-cape-cod/story?id=20591168
(describing
the
conditions under which the Hobarts filed a nuisance lawsuit).

78.

Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1075.

79.

See, e.g., Tanya Mortensen, An Unattainable Wedge: Four Limiting
Effects on the Expansion of Nuclear Power, 5 Envtl. & Energy L. &
Pol’y J. 60, 79–80 (2010) (following Chernobyl and TMI, protesters
forced the shutdown of numerous nuclear plants).

80.

See “We Want to Fight for This Cause”: Nuclear Refugees from
Fukushima Join Anti-Nuke Protests, Democracy Now!, Jan. 17, 2014,
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/1/17/we_want_to_fight_for_this
(providing a rough transcript of the interviewed accounts of those
joining the Fukushima Refugees protests).
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would be added in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to meet
future demand increases.81
But wind siting disputes are different than fossil fuel siting
disputes, in three key ways. First, the nature of the costs and the
benefits of the project are different, which can affect how the
community weighs approval of a project. The primary costs of fossil
fuel plants (largely air pollution and increased carbon emissions) are
regional or national in scope. But the benefit, electrical power, is often
enjoyed by the local community, because many fossil fuel plants are
located near the load centers that they serve. By comparison, the
primary costs of wind power (aesthetics, nuisances, and safety risks)
are borne locally, while the primary benefit (reduced emissions) is
enjoyed by the nation as a whole. Therefore when assessing a wind
project, a community is more likely to recognize most of the harm but
only reap a portion of the benefit—and this imbalance is exacerbated
when the proposed wind farm is in an area of low population density
and would therefore be exporting much of its generation. At the
margin, it is possible that communities will reject wind farms even if
they produce a net benefit to society as a whole.
Second, new fossil fuel capacity tends to be sited in different
environments than new wind capacity. As Salkin and Ostrow note,
fossil fuel plants are often built in industrial areas, where the
landscape is already afflicted by progress and additional aesthetic
harm is a difference of degree rather than kind.82 But wind projects
are often located in undeveloped places, which can generate more
opposition. Robert Kahn observes that “[a] project which fits into a
preexisting industrial mold is not likely to be accused of ruining the
landscape. A renewable energy project is not as lucky. Americans put
a high value on wilderness and open space. Sparks fly when lands
viewed as public viewscapes . . . appear threatened.”83
Finally, renewable projects are more likely than fossil fuel projects
to be site-specific. Fossil fuels are portable. If a local jurisdiction
denies a particular project, the company can seek out another site in
the vicinity that may serve as an adequate substitute. But wind and
solar generation depend on site-specific criteria. Wind turbines can
only be located where the wind blows with regularity and strength
sufficient to produce cost-efficient electricity. And utility-scale solar
projects must be built in hot, arid climates were solar power is
strongest and weather is least likely to interfere with operations. The
81.

PJM Interconnection, LLC, 2007 Regional Transmission
Expansion Plan 66 (2008), available at http://pjm.com/~/media/
documents/reports/2007-rtep/2007-section3a.ashx.

82.

Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1071.

83.

Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting
Renewable Energy Power Plants, Electricity J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 23.
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denial of a permit to build on a particular site is often not a delay
until an alternative site is found, but instead a more permanent denial
of an opportunity to add to the nation’s renewable energy capacity.
B.

Transmission Challenges

The development of new renewable energy is somewhat of a
“chicken and egg” problem: power companies are reluctant to develop
new renewable generation facilities without adequate transmission
capacity to bring the electricity to load centers.84 But transmission
companies are unlikely to build lines to new areas without a
guarantee that there will be sufficient generation in the area to make
the lines cost-effective.85
The need for additional transmission capacity is one of the most
significant stumbling blocks to further development of renewable
energy. As Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson note, the “first
generation” of installed wind was often located in areas served by
existing transmission capacity.86 With this low-hanging fruit gone, the
“second generation” of renewable energy will likely require new
transmission lines to connect these energy sources to the power grid.
Of course, renewable generation is inextricably intertwined with
transmission investment. And as noted above, because renewable
electricity is location-constrained, new generation cannot simply be
built in a convenient location close to existing transmission lines and
load centers. Some of the greatest wind and solar potential lies in the
prairie states and the southwestern United States, respectively. But
these are remote areas that are not sufficiently connected to the
existing transmission grid. Transmission line upgrades can be both
slow and expensive: the estimated cost of upgrading the Western
Interconnection grid to integrate just currently planned renewable
projects within the grid’s footprint is $200 billion.87
Constructing new transmission lines is also difficult because of the
fragmented regulatory authority over the transmission system. As
noted above, FERC regulates interstate power sales and oversees
operation of the existing transmission system. But while the agency
has assumed for itself a role in planning future transmission capacity
84.

Stan Mark Kaplan, Cong. Research Serv., R40511, Electric
Power Transmission: Background and Policy Issues 19 (2009);
Jennifer E. Gardner & Ronald L. Lehr, Enabling the Widespread
Adoption of Wind Energy in the Western United States: The Case for
Transmission, Operations and Market Reforms, 31 J. Energy & Nat.
Res. L. 237, 249 (2013).

85.

See Gardner & Lehr, supra note 84, at 249 (“[T]ransmission is often not
built because it is not clear that renewable energy projects will actually
be developed to use the transmission.”).

86.

Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811.

87.

Id. at 1812.

1637

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy

projects, it lacks general authority to approve the siting of new
transmission lines.88 That authority remains with state and local
officials. To construct an interstate transmission line from a resourcerich Midwestern state to a coastal load center, the applicant must pay
for, and receive, regulatory approval from each state along the line’s
path, and often various local authorities as well.89 These applications
are costly to prepare and can subject even the most obviously
beneficial projects to lengthy regulatory delays. And since each state
along the line has an effective veto right, any one of them can
effectively eliminate the line or extract rents as a condition
of approval.
Like generation siting authority, the placement of transmission
line siting authority at the state or local level raises the possibility
that parochial opposition will delay or eliminate a proposal that is a
net benefit to society. Like wind turbines, the installation of new
high-voltage power lines often draws substantial local opposition, both
in populated areas and more rural environments.90 Power lines are
aesthetically displeasing, especially when poised to cross recreational
land, scenic trails, or parks.91 They also interfere with activities like
crop dusting and can be dangerous when downed by storms or
accidents. Given these local costs, many state and local officials are
unwilling to approve a transmission project that does not directly
benefit that area, even if there is a clear regional or national benefit
from installing the line.92
One sees the parochial nature of such decisions in the saga
surrounding California Edison’s proposed 230-mile transmission line
from California to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in
Arizona in 2005. Although the line would be funded entirely by
California ratepayers, and the California Public Utilities Commission
approved the California portion of the line,93 the Arizona Corporation
88.

Id. at 1815. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 gave FERC limited backstop
authority to approve interstate transmission lines under limited
circumstances, but the agency has been unable to exercise that
authority. See infra Part III.A.

89.

See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line
Siting Authority, 39 Envtl. L. 1015, 1018–33 (2009) (outlining the
various problems associated with erecting interstate transmission lines).

90.

James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the
Western United States: Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 Idaho L.
Rev. 379, 381 (2010) (discussing the “NIMBY syndrome” as related to
electric transmission lines).

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

S. Cal. Edison Co., 07-01-040 2007 WL 951285, at *2, *52 (Cal. P.U.C.
Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/
FINAL_DECISION/64017.pdf.
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Commission rejected the line.94 Ostensibly, Arizona rejected the line
because of environmental concerns. But in an accompanying press
release, one commissioner stated, “[i]t comes down to this: California
wants to drop a 230-mile extension cord into Arizona at a time when
Arizona is the fastest growing state in the nation.”95 Another
explained, “I don’t want Arizona to become an energy farm for
California. This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air
and our water to provide electricity to California.”96 Importantly, the
Supreme Court long ago ruled that the Commerce Clause prohibited
one state from hoarding its electrical power for its own residents.97
Yet Arizona used its transmission siting authority to accomplish
precisely this goal.
As Ashley Brown and Jim Rossi have explored at length, several
states’ siting laws also act as barriers to transmission construction.98
Many state public utility commissions must certify that new
construction is in the “public interest,” which requires them to
balance the benefits and the costs of the new line, but only with focus
on in-state residents.99 This standard, a relic of the era of vertically
integrated intrastate utility operations, can be the death knell of
transmission projects that are beneficial to the country as a whole but
a net negative to residents within a particular state that the line must
traverse. In other states, entities that are not classified as in-state
utilities holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity may
be ineligible to build a transmission line, or may not qualify to use
eminent domain like a utility would.100
The dearth of recent transmission construction projects testifies to
the difficulties under the existing model. Alexandra Klass notes that
although demand for electricity rose twenty-five percent from 1990
until 2009, construction of new transmission lines fell by thirty
94.

S. Cal. Edison Co., 69638 2007 WL 2126365, at *1 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n
June 6, 2007), available at http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/ docketpdf/
0000073735.pdf.

95.

Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, Regulators Reject “Extension Cord
for Cal.”: Comm’rs Reject Palo Verde to Devers II Power Line 1 (May
30, 2007), available at http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/administration/
news/Devers_II_Vote.pdf (quoting Commissioner Kris Mayes).

96.

Id. at 2 (quoting Commissioner Bill Mundell); see also Rossi, supra note
89, at 1022.

97.

New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).

98.

See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 89; Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting
Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the
“Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 705 (2010).

99.

Brown & Rossi, supra note 98, at 706–07.

100. Id. at 720.
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percent.101 Klass further notes that “[b]etween 2000 and 2008, the
United States added only 668 total miles of interstate transmission
lines.”102 New transmission construction is particularly important for
renewable energy, whose best sources lie largely in sparsely populated
areas without sufficient transmission capacity to carry the electricity
to the existing grid. This results, says Klass, in “new renewable
generation sources waiting for years to connect to the transmission
grid in many regions of the country.”103
While there are many reasons for this phenomenon, the American
Society of Civil Engineers echoes the views of many by citing “[o]verly
stringent permitting requirements, lawsuits, and other regulatory
issues” as the primary culprits.104 One finds support for this assertion
in the high incidence of new construction that takes advantage of
various loopholes to avoid state-by-state siting approval. For example,
several currently planned interstate transmission construction projects
will occur largely on federal land, particularly those designed to bring
more renewable energy to the grid. These include SunZia, a proposed
500-mile line to bring wind and solar energy across the southwestern
United States, and the Zephyr Project, a proposed 950-mile line from
eastern Wyoming to the Southwest, both of which seek to put
significant portions of the line on land managed by the federal Bureau
of Land Management.105 The federal government has authority to
permit construction on federal land, which bypasses potentially more
cumbersome state procedures. In addition, a number of new projects
are so-called “merchant lines,” which are privately owned and
financed by nonutilities. Because the merchant-line owners are not
subject to Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction, they can
sometimes sidestep Commission “public interest” review. SunZia and
Zephyr are both merchant-line projects, as is the recently completed
Cross-Sound Cable from Connecticut to Long Island, New York.106
Cost allocation is also a significant challenge for new transmission
generation. Traditionally, state public utility commissions factor
transmission costs into the retail rate base for utility customers, on
101. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079,
1084 (2013). This mismatch stemmed in part from conscious efforts by
utilities to use their transmission capacity more efficiently. This means
more lines run closer to full capacity, which reduces system redundancy
and therefore stability.
102. Id. at 1085.
103. Id. at 1116.
104. Id. at 1086 (citing Am. Soc’y Civil Eng’rs, 2009 Report Card for
America’s Infrastructure 136 (2009), http://www. infrastructure
reportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/RC2009_full_ report.pdf).
105. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1826–27.
106. Klass, supra note 101, at 1122.
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the theory that transmission costs are part of the costs of providing
service to those customers.107 Of course, not all of a utility’s
transmission capacity serves its retail customers; some is sold to other
utilities through wheeling arrangements. Ratemakers generally adjust
for this by granting retail customers a credit for wheeling and other
revenues that the utility receives from transmission activities. But as
Rossi notes, this leaves the retail customers bearing the residual risk
of transmission costs—risk that would be better divided among the
utility’s various transmission customers.108 At the margin, this can
lead state regulators to deny approval of transmission projects that
impose significant residual risk on consumers who do not benefit from
the project. And even where costs are allocated across the line owner’s
transmission customers, significant disputes arise about which entities
should bear which costs, which can hamstring complex, expensive
interstate transmission projects.
C.

Grid Stability Challenges

Renewable generation also endangers the stability of the
electricity grid’s ongoing operations. Because electricity is not easily
stored, electricity supply must constantly match electricity demand.
At any given time, the amount of energy that generators dispatch to
an electricity grid must match the amount that consumers are taking
off the grid. Otherwise blackouts may result.109 In the days of
vertically integrated monopolies, the utility performed this load
management function internally, bringing on additional generation as
needed to meet demand and managing fluctuations in the electricity
supply.110 Today, many utilities source their electricity from
generators in wholesale markets, through long-term power contracts
coupled with instantaneous spot markets to fill momentary demand
variations.
Renewable energy exacerbates the already-challenging task of grid
management because renewable energy tends to be intermittent rather
than constant and is often difficult to predict. Unlike fossil fuel or
nuclear generators, which can be activated or idled on planned
schedules, wind turbines generate electricity only when the wind
blows, and the power produced varies as wind speeds change.
Similarly, solar panels generate more electricity when the sun is
shining and skies are not overcast.111 And unfortunately, nature does
107. Brown & Rossi, supra note 98, at 727.
108. Id.
109. See Spence, supra note 9, at 273–74 (“If [generation and consumption]
loads are not balanced, the system will fail, causing blackouts . . . .”).
110. Id. at 274–75.
111. See David J. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab.,
Colorado’s Prospects for Interstate Commerce in Renewable
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not always accede to meet peak demand, nor can excess energy be
stored away for use during high-demand periods. Generally, grid
operators seek to dispatch electricity to the grid in “ascending order
of marginal cost.”112 Because the marginal costs of renewable
generation is nearly zero, it is dispatched first. But anytime
intermittent, unpredictable sources of renewable energy are
dispatched to the system, overall grid stability suffers because the
electricity is subject to reduction or interruption without notice.
To meet this challenge, grid operators must maintain reliable
backup reserves that can ramp up quickly to fill gaps in demand.113
Fossil fuel generators such as natural gas or coal can meet this need
most efficiently, but their use negatively impacts the environmental
benefits of renewable generation. Even in a backup role, natural gas
and coal reactors must remain “spinning,” burning fuel and producing
emissions, to reduce the lag time from dispatch to delivery of backup
electricity.114 And if these generators are constantly cycled up and
down to fill the gaps created by renewable energy variation, they will
operate less efficiently than if they were running at a constant rate.
This means they will consume more fuel per megawatt-hour generated
and will see greater wear and tear on the power plant.115 Nuclear
power has a significant lag between startup and delivery of electricity
to the grid, which reduces its usefulness as a source of backup power.
Most other generation sources lack the scale to serve as effective
sources of backup generation.
Over time, industry maturity and technological advancement may
give grid operators additional tools to address the variability of wind
and other intermittent renewable generation. For example,
development of energy storage solutions such as pumped hydro (which
uses excess electricity capacity during periods of low demand to pump
water uphill, which can then be used to generate hydroelectric power
during peak times) may provide an alternative to backup generators
to fill gaps in energy supply. Diversifying wind production across
several different geographic areas within a grid area can reduce the
variation in total wind energy delivered to the grid, because
momentary losses of generation in one area may be offset by
momentary generation increases elsewhere. And better predictive
models can give grid operators more insight into variation, allowing

Power 16 (2009) (discussing the difficulties wind and solar power
create for “routine grid operations”).
112. Spence, supra note 9, at 288.
113. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811.
114. Spence, supra note 9, at 289
115. Id.
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them to be better prepared when renewable energy is interrupted.116
But these potential future innovations do little now to alleviate the
pressure that grid operators currently face as greater amounts of
renewable energy come online.
D.

Demand Side Concerns

Finally, several commentators have found fault with state-driven
renewable portfolio standards. Although these critics recognize that
state standards have played an important role in stimulating demand
for renewable generation, they recognize two problems with statebased renewable energy targets.
First, state standards vary with regard to their renewable targets,
which renewable resources count toward those targets, whether
tradable REC certificates can satisfy renewable portfolio
requirements, and compliance mechanisms. As one commentator put
it, “[i]f America’s interstate highway system were structured like our
renewable energy market, drivers would be forced to change engines,
tire pressure, and fuel mixture every time they crossed state lines.”117
A uniform definition would unify the market, allowing for greater
economies of scale in renewable energy and reducing the costs and
risks of investment in renewable generation.118
Second, state-based initiatives create somewhat of a free-rider
problem. The environmental benefits of substituting renewable energy
for traditional fossil fuels are regional or national in scope. But
because renewable energy is more expensive than conventional power,
the costs are borne largely by customers in states that have enacted
renewable portfolio standards. Those states that have not enacted
binding renewable requirements are, in essence, reaping the benefits of
renewable energy without shouldering their share of the costs.119

III. Federal Preemption of Electricity Regulation
and Its Alternatives
A.

Federal Governance Through Preemption

Many proponents of renewable energy have looked toward federal
preemption as a solution to all or part of these obstacles. Some of
these efforts have been successful: for example, the Energy Policy Act
116. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811.
117. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong:
The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications
for Policy, 3 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 85, 92 (2008).
118. Id.; see also Davies, supra note 64, at 1366.
119. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 1, 9–13
(2007).
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of 2005120 gave the federal government limited backstop authority over
transmission siting issues,121 although, as detailed below, legal
challenges have precluded the agency from exercising that
authority.122 Other proposed legislation would go further. In 2009, for
example, members of Congress introduced at least five different bills
that would have granted FERC increased oversight of new
transmission line construction projects.123 Perhaps the most prominent
of these was the mammoth American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009,124 better known as the Waxman-Markey Bill. While the
Waxman-Markey Bill was most famous for its attempt to create a
federal cap-and-trade provision for greenhouse gases, other provisions
would have expanded federal oversight of transmission decisions,
including establishing a FERC-supervised regional transmission
planning process and expanding the agency’s backstop siting
authority.125 The bill also would have established a federal minimum
resource portfolio requirement of six percent of electric power from
renewable resources by 2012, rising to twenty percent by 2020.126
Though the bill passed the House, it was never considered by
the Senate.
There is little dispute that the federal government could regulate
virtually the entire electricity industry, if it chose to do so. Over
thirty years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi127 that Congress could have
preempted the field of electricity regulation completely and that
continued state regulation exists merely because Congress allows it.
The deregulation of electricity generation and the growth of renewable
energy have only increased the interstate character of the industry in
the years since.
Moreover, federal preemption is not an unprecedented solution to
coordination problems, particularly in the energy sector. As far back
as 1938, the Natural Gas Act128 granted the Federal Power
Commission (now FERC) with exclusive jurisdiction over construction
120. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
121. § 1221.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 197–99.
123. See Tara Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting
Authority over Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 47 Harv. J. on
Legis. 253, 261–67 (2010) (summarizing legislation).
124. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
125. H.R. 2454, § 151.
126. H.R. 2454, § 101.
127. 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982).
128. Pub. L. No. 688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717).
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of interstate natural gas pipelines and facilities, including siting
authority.129 In 2005, FERC and California clashed over whether that
authority extended to liquefied natural gas facilities that lie entirely
within a state.130 At FERC’s request, Congress settled the dispute by
granting FERC “exclusive authority to approve or deny an
application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an
LNG terminal.”131
But the question of whether Congress could preempt state
electricity regulation is quite different, and far easier, than the
question of whether, and to what extent, it should do so. The answer
to this question turns upon the relative strength of federal actors as
regulators vis-à-vis their state counterparts. While federalism scholars
have identified several potential justifications for a move toward more
centralized regulation,132 two stand out as potentially applicable to the
renewable energy debate: controlling spillover effects and the need for
uniformity or harmonization.
In the context of federalism, spillovers occur when a regulator’s
activities have effects beyond the scope of the regulator’s jurisdiction.
In economic terms these are known as externalities. As Professor (and
former Judge) Michael McConnell explains:
[e]xternalities present the principal countervailing consideration
in favor of centralized government: if the costs of government
action are borne by the citizens of State C, but the benefits are
shared by the citizens of States D, E, and F, State C will be
unwilling to expend the level of resources commensurate with
the full social benefit of the action.133

129. See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 821 (8th
Cir. 2004) (finding that federal regulations and the NGA occupy the
field of “extension, operation, and acquisition of natural gas facilities,”
thereby preempting any state authority to do so).
130. Sound Energy Solutions, 106 FERC ¶ 61,279 (2004) (declaratory order
asserting exclusive jurisdiction).
131. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311(c)(2), 119 Stat.
686 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)).
132. See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 Conn. L.
Rev. 217, 227 (2012) (discussing transboundary issues, the need for
uniformity, avoiding a race to the bottom by state regulators,
countering NIMBY opposition, and providing public goods that require
resource pooling) (citing Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A
Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102
Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 594–600 (2008)).
133. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design,
54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1495 (1987).
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To control spillover effects, the policy choice should be vested at a
level large enough that decisions reflect the full costs and full benefits
of the proposed action.134
Preemption also has the benefit of uniformity: it replaces a
patchwork of potentially inconsistent or contradictory standards with
a single rule and a single government interface. Uniformity reduces
the transaction costs of compliance with government mandates, as a
company need only approach a single federal authority to seek
regulatory action, guidance, or exemption. Uniformity also reduces
uncertainty: a company can enter a regional or national market
knowing the legal framework that will govern the service throughout
the market, with minimal risk that the law will suddenly shift in part,
but not all, of the applicable service area.
When viewed through these lenses, one can understand why
renewable energy advocates are drawn to preemption-based policy
solutions. Expansion of the renewable power sector is an interstate
matter. The central challenge is how to generate electricity in
resource-rich Midwestern and Southwestern states and bring that
electricity to load centers in other parts of the country. State and
local officials with veto authority can block specific renewable
generation facilities or transmission lines. As noted above, the costs of
these facilities are largely local, but the benefits are regional or
national in scope.135 Because the state decision maker is structurally
inhibited from considering the full benefits of such facilities, a
decentralized scheme makes it possible for parochial interests to block
new construction that will be a net benefit to society. Preemption of
siting authority would vest final decision making in a national official,
whose scope of inquiry is large enough to encompass all of the costs
and all of the benefits of a proposed facility.
Preemption would also facilitate greater economies of scale in grid
operations. In investing, diversification is often a successful strategy
to mitigate risk from a volatile asset. Similarly, one can smooth the
disruptions caused by intermittency of wind and solar energy by
increasing the area from which the grid may dispatch power. Wind
speeds may slow in eastern Colorado, but if they pick up in Wyoming
or the sun comes out in New Mexico, the gains offset the losses as
long as all the assets are tied to the same grid. And if scale alone does
not smooth out renewable intermittency, a larger grid area increases
the potential alternatives from which to source backup generation
assets. Building interstate economies of scale may mean placing grid
operations in the hands of a regulator above the state level. This

134. Id. at 1494.
135. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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minimizes the likelihood that parochial interests will disrupt those
economies of scale and unnecessarily destabilize the system.136
Finally, preemption proponents claim that a national resource
portfolio standard would provide uniformity and clarity to investors
seeking to develop renewable generation. Lincoln Davies argues that
by clarifying the rules and reducing uncertainty, a national standard
would eliminate potential jurisdictional concerns and “make the
renewables market more liquid, transparent, and uniform.”137 It would
also increase total renewable electricity demand by eliminating the
opportunity for states to free ride on the efforts of their neighbors.138
B.

The Matching Principle and Regional Governance

On first glance, therefore, federal preemption appears to be an
attractive option for overcoming the obstacles to renewable energy
development. A federal approach would correct for state actors’
disincentives to consider interstate benefits of flowing renewable
energy and eliminate free riding by recalcitrant fossil-fuel-friendly
states. A uniform, consistent approach would also provide
predictability and certainty to key industry players.
But upon closer examination, much of this analysis merely
suggests that state and local regulation alone is insufficient to solve
the problem of renewable electricity. This does not necessarily imply
that a federal solution is better. Traditional preemption analysis and
dual federalism regimes like that created under the Federal Power Act
often assume a false dichotomy between state and federal officials.
The optimal jurisdiction may instead lie somewhere in between.
McConnell warns that while it is “well understood” that
externalities warn against placing national decisions in the hands of
local officials, “[i]t is less well understood that nationalizing decisions
where the impact is primarily local has an equal and opposite
effect.”139 Centralized decision makers often lack the ability or
inclination to understand how a project will impact a specific local
community. This opens the door for one strong local or regional
interest to capture the decision-making process and use it to shift

136. Cf. Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular
Phone Regulation?, 56 Fed. Comm. L.J. 155 (2003) (discussing the role
of preemption in building and preserving national economies of scale for
wireless telephone service).
137. Davies, supra note 64, at 1366.
138. See id. at 1366–67 (discussing the “value of renewable power” across
state boundaries).
139. McConnell, supra note 133, at 1495.
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costs to less politically powerful regions.140 It is just as problematic to
go “too large” in jurisdictional design as it is to go “too small.”
Thus when designing a governing scheme, “[t]he unit of decision
making must be large enough so that decisions reflect the full costs
and benefits, but small enough that destructive competition for the
benefits of central government action is minimized.”141 Henry Butler
and Jonathan Macey have dubbed this approach “the Matching
Principle.”142 The Matching Principle states that, in general, the size
of the geographic area affected by a specific decision should determine
the appropriate governmental level for regulation.143 Jonathan Adler
and others have used the Matching Principle to diagnose
jurisdictional mismatches in environmental policy.144 The approach is
equally useful when examining any question of optimal jurisdiction
analysis, including the challenges posed by renewable energy.
Using the Matching Principle, one quickly realizes the error in
traditional preemption analysis: for many issues, the relevant
geographic area is not national, but regional. Many factors testify to
the fact that electricity markets are regional in scope. Perhaps most
fundamentally, electricity dissipates as it travels over transmission
and distribution lines. This is known as “line loss.”145 Although it can
be mitigated by using more expensive, higher-voltage transmission
lines or DC transmission lines, line loss places physical limitations on
the distance that electricity can travel economically between
generators and load centers.
This truth is reflected in the structure of the nation’s transmission
system. Although policymakers often refer to the nation’s “electricity
grid,” in fact the contiguous United States is divided into three

140. Id. at 1496. McConnell cites the use of federal environmental laws to
“protect eastern ‘dirty’ coal from competition from western ‘clean’
coal[,]” and federal railroad regulation that favored the maintenance of
traffic to areas of low population density at the sacrifice of traffic in
more urban areas. Id. (citing Bruce A. Ackerman & William T.
Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981); S. Ry. v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 93 (1964)).
141. McConnell, supra note 133, at 1494–95.
142. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 23 (1996).
143. Id. at 25.
144. See id. at 25–26; Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130 (2005).
145. See Richard L. Fanyo, State Jurisdiction and Retail Wheeling, in The
Electric Industry: Opportunities and Impacts for Resource
Producers, Power Generators, Marketers, and Consumers pt.
4, at 4–2 (1996).
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separate grids, known as “interconnections.”146 The Continental
Divide roughly separates the Western Interconnection from the much
larger Eastern Interconnection, while most of Texas is on a separate
Interconnection known as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or
ERCOT.147 These Interconnections developed organically over the
past century as individual utilities slowly linked their transmission
systems together to operate joint power plants or to sell surplus
electricity to one another.148 Within each Interconnection, the AC grid
must be precisely synchronized so that all generators rotate at sixty
cycles per second. There are only eight low-capacity links, known as
DC ties, connecting the Interconnections to one another. In essence,
the continental United States is physically divided into three separate
electricity grids with limited connections.

146. See Kaplan, supra note 84, at 3.
147. Id. at 3 fig.2.
148. Id. at 3. ERCOT is a purely intrastate transmission system that Texas
utilities purposely separated from the rest of the electricity grid in the
1930s to avoid Federal Power Commission jurisdiction. See Ron Santini,
Electric Transmission and Distribution Network, Pa. St. U.,
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog469/node/222 (last visited Feb.
17, 2014).
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Figure 1149

But even this image gives the impression that regional electricity
markets are much larger than they are. Within these three
interconnections, approximately 130 different balancing authorities
are charged with operating the grid.150 Each balancing authority is
responsible for matching generation to demand within a specific
geographic area on a real-time basis.151 These balancing authorities
range in size from single-utility-sized authorities to massive multistate
regional transmission organizations. Although some electricity flows
between balancing authorities through a process known as “dynamic
transfer,”152 these balancing authorities can be considered a rough
proxy for regional electricity markets within which most generation,
transmission, and distribution occurs.153
149. Santini, supra note 148.
150. Kaplan, supra note 83, at 4.
151. See Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards, N. Am.
Electric Reliability Corp. 9, http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/
glossary%20of%20terms/glossary_of_terms.pdf (last updated Feb. 4,
2014).
152. See Timothy P. Duane & Kiran H. Griffith, Legal, Technical, and
Economic Challenges in Integrating Renewable Power Generation into
the Electricity Grid, 4 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 1, 45
(2013).
153. Cf. Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional
Electric Grid Integration, 28 Energy L.J. 147 (2007) (discussing the
development of regional energy markets through transmission
coordination).
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The Matching Principle thus suggests that many renewable
energy challenges are thus best addressed through efforts at creating
regional governance. But because regions are not distinct political
entities like states or the national government, there is no obvious
pre-existing institution in which to vest decision-making authority.
The Matching Principle helps identify the appropriate size of the
jurisdiction but offers little insight regarding how one might foster
greater regional governance.
C.

Building Regional Governance Through Cooperative Federalism

There are two primary ways that one might encourage regional
governance. The first is a top-down approach, preempting state
authority and replacing it with a series of regional institutions
designed and overseen by federal authorities. The second is a bottomup approach, which uses incentives to encourage state and local
officials to work together in pursuit of broader regional objectives.
The issue of which strategy to pursue depends largely upon a
weighing of the benefits of a more centralized governance structure
against the potential gains from a more decentralized approach.
Because it is a function of federal preemptive authority, top-down
initiatives tend to benefit from the uniformity and consistency of
preemptive models. Overall policy is set by the federal regulator and
is imposed upon the regional structures, which act essentially as
regional subdepartments of the federal government. This model is
most appropriate when enforcing policies upon which there is a broad
national consensus and where there is little difference among regions
in ways that are relevant to carrying out the policy objective. In these
situations, regional entities are less like policymakers and more like
regional enforcement authorities, determining the best way to carry
out the federal government’s will within a specific geographic region.
In recent years, cooperative federalism has emerged as an
alternative to top-down imposition of federal policies.154 As its name
implies, cooperative federalism involves a shared power arrangement
between the federal government and the states. Typically, the federal
government sets the basic policy goals of a regulatory scheme, but
states rather than federal subordinates are enlisted to carry out the
mandate. These states are generally given some latitude in
enforcement as long as they stay within the broad confines of the
federal guidelines.155
Phil Weiser explains “the cooperative federalism regulatory
strategy makes sense where the benefits of allowing diversity in
federal regulatory programs outweigh the benefits of demanding
154. See Stein, supra note 132, at 226 (internal quotations omitted).
155. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of
Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 384 (2005).
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uniformity in all situations.”156 It thus works well when the federal
government has a broad policy that it wishes to pursue, but there is
no clear consensus regarding precisely how that policy should be
achieved. Cooperative federalism regimes then seek to capture many
of the benefits of federalism and decentralized policymaking, while
using a light federal touch to make sure state and local
experimentation do not disrupt broader national objectives. Weiser
and other commentators have identified several related ways in which
cooperative federalism promotes policy diversity.
The first is to allow states to tailor the application of the federal
policy to local conditions.157 It is thus helpful in situations where local
conditions differ in ways that are relevant to the broader federal
scheme. Federal regulators often lack familiarity with the
idiosyncrasies of a local area. By co-opting state and local officials
who are much closer to the constituents that they serve, cooperative
federalism allows policymakers to leverage local knowledge in pursuit
of broader national or regional objective.158
Second, cooperative federalism fosters competition between states.
Within the confines of the federal scheme, different states can
experiment with different policy approaches, allowing society to test
empirically the results of particular policy choices. Citizens and
businesses unsatisfied with a state’s approach may “vote with their
feet” by relocating to a more hospitable regulatory climate; as
jurisdictions tailor their policies to compete for such residents, society
arrives at an efficient level of provision of public services.159 Although
competition between states can sometimes result in a destructive race
to the bottom, Weiser notes that “at least four decades of economic

156. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and
the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1698
(2001).
157. Id. at 1698–1700.
158. Id. at 1699–1700.
159. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol.
Econ. 416 (1956). Of course, voting with one’s feet is expensive.
Tiebout’s model only really affects those public goods that consumers
determine are important enough to relocate. Public education and crime
are quintessential examples. It is unclear whether the issues surrounding
renewable energy generation are sufficiently important to the average
residential consumer as to affect his or her choice of where to live. It
may, however, be an important factor for businesses when deciding
where to build operations. See Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 32–37
(1981) (“[R]esidents can migrate freely from one community to another
and, as a consequence, they will calculate the impact of local
government decisions in choosing their community of residence.”). And
of course, competition among states is likely to influence the deployment
of renewable energy specifically within a state.
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theory and empirical research” supports the notion that competition
among states can produce better policy outcomes.160
Third, cooperative federalism allows states to experiment with
different ways to accomplish a federal objective. As Justice Kennedy
aptly summarized, when “considerable disagreement exists about how
best to accomplish [a] goal . . . the theory and utility of our federalism
are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is
far from clear.”161 This allows individual states to test new and
innovative policy approaches without risking harm to the country as a
whole.162 From these experiments, states may uncover new and better
ways to accomplish federal goals that would have never been
discovered had the country been subjected to a comprehensive federal
scheme from the beginning.
Finally, cooperative federalism helps preserve some of the
accountability that decentralized government provides. A
decentralized regime brings decision making closer to the people
affected by regulation.163 Local governments are responsible for a
much smaller polity than their federal counterparts, and therefore are
in a better position to know and respond to local concerns.164 This
greater responsiveness encourages public participation and
accountability, and more broadly may foster the development of social
capital that helps make a community greater than the sum of its
parts.165 Of course, this can be a double-edged sword. Many
commentators have noted that cooperative federalism can lead to
constituent confusion, because the federal government sets the policy
objective but state and local officials are the face of that policy to the
local community.166 This was, of course, the primary reason that
160. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1700.
161. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
162. Weiser, supra note 156, at 1702–03.
163. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 59 (2004).
164. See id. (quoting Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L.
Rev. 317, 395 (1997) (“Officials ought to look their constituents in the
eye on the street and see them in the grocery store.”)).
165. See Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 27, 29 (2001) (arguing federalism provides social
benefits by promoting relationships that to “allow citizens to overcome
collective action barriers and to get things done”).
166. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 155, at 386. Adler notes that blurring lines
of accountability may be one reason why federal policymakers favor
cooperative federalism regimes: they allow policymakers to take credit
for the benefits of an initiative while shifting the cost of unpopular
enforcement to state officials. Id.
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Montana Sheriff Jay Printz objected to being commandeered to serve
as the face of federal gun control efforts.167
Together, these rationales support a bottom-up, cooperative
federalism approach to achieving regional cooperation for renewable
energy. The federal government has recognized a broad policy
objective of pursuing more renewable electricity generation in order to
reduce carbon emissions, diversify America’s energy mix, and reduce
its dependence on foreign energy sources.168 But although it has been
around for three decades, the renewable power sector is still relatively
young and is just starting to achieve economies of scale that will
make it a viable alternative to fossil fuel generation. There is no clear
consensus yet regarding which forms of renewable energy are best,
how best to bring new generation to market, or what the ideal fuel
mix is between renewable energy and more traditional energy sources.
Given that there is so little consensus on these important policy
questions, the industry is likely to benefit from continued interstate
competition and experimentation as policymakers find the best way to
develop more renewable energy.
Moreover, different regions have different renewable energy stores
available. Prairie states and offshore Atlantic wind farms are likely to
pursue wind energy; southwestern states may develop more solar and
geothermal energy; southern states are more likely to harness biomass;
and so on. A comprehensive renewable energy plan will thus depend
on local knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of several local
geographic areas, which argues in favor of a greater role for state and
local authorities.

IV. Overcoming Obstacles to Renewable Energy
Through Cooperative Federalism
Thus cooperative federalism provides a mechanism by which state
and local officials can, and should, play a significant role in helping
develop the future of renewable energy. Although, as noted above,
state and local officials can be obstacles to renewable energy
development, this stems in part from the fact that renewable
development implicates many state and local issues. This section
examines specific ways that the federal government can use
cooperative federalism to increase state and local officials’ sensitivity
to broader regional goals and to encourage greater regional
cooperation in pursuit of national objectives.

167. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1997).
168. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 19 Stat. 594
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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Siting Renewable Generation Facilities

Like most land use regulations, the siting of specific renewable
generation facilities is largely a local issue.169 The questions of
whether, when, and how a company should be permitted to build a
wind turbine or photovoltaic solar array in a local community
depends significantly upon local information regarding the impact of
the access on the surrounding environment. Local officials will know
key issues such as the value to the community of scenic vistas that
may be affected by construction, and the proximity of the proposed
turbine to local population centers and therefore the extent to which
its operations would pose a nuisance to the community. Finally, local
officials would be in the best position to determine what conditions
may be appropriate to abate any potential nuisances, such as limited
hours of operation, setbacks, or safety regulations.
It would be a mistake for the federal government to preempt
renewable generation siting authority, as it has done with regard to
liquefied natural gas terminals. This move may bring new generation
to market faster and provide an easy avenue to overcome local
opposition, though that is not certain: federal siting authority may be
subject to federal statutes such as NEPA, which create additional
veto gates that determined opponents could use to slow the federal
siting process.170 But even if it could, this expediency comes at the
expense of local knowledge. Federal regulators would be less capable
of assessing proposed sites and distinguishing valid from invalid
objections to assess the true cost that the project will impose on the
local community. As Kenneth Kristl explains, preemption eliminates
the political mechanism that keeps local officials attuned to the
community’s needs: to wit, the political risk of ignoring community
opposition and being voted out of office.171
But as noted above, purely local siting decisions run the risk of
denying projects that are net beneficial to society. A local decision
maker will weigh the largely local costs of construction to the
community, but may fail to account for the benefit of renewable
energy, which is largely regional in scope. Moreover, denial of a
renewable generation facility may disrupt economies of scale across
the interstate electricity grid, as it reduces a source of renewable

169. Stein, supra note 132, at 221.
170. Cf. Holtkamp & Davidson, supra note 90, at 384–85 (noting that state
and local opposition to federal transmission project approvals can delay
construction by challenging federal environmental impact statements or
by litigating the line until the impact statement expires).
171. Kenneth T. Kristl, Renewable Energy and Preemption: Lessons from
Siting LNG Terminals, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Winter 2009, at 58,
60.
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power and therefore a chance to smooth intermittent renewable
resources through expansion.
One can solve this problem by using cooperative federalism to
constrain the local official’s discretion and require him or her to
examine the project from a more regional scope. Ostrow recommends
a “process preemption” approach that leaves primary siting authority
in local hands but places explicit procedural and sometimes
substantive limits on the local official’s authority.172 This approach is
modeled on the provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996173
governing cell tower siting. Prior to the 1996 Act, communities
frequently opposed the installation of cell towers, because of aesthetic
harm and the fear of electromagnetic radiation. The 1996 Act helped
curtail this behavior by reining in the local siting approval process.174
The Act places numerous procedural requirements on the local
authority, including a shot clock requiring a response within a
reasonable period of time, a requirement that any decision be in
writing and a federal right of action to appeal a denial in federal court
if the denial “unreasonably discriminate[s] among providers of
functionally equivalent services” or “prohibit[s] or has the effect of
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless service.”175 The Act also
prohibits local authorities from rejecting cell towers because of the
fear of electromagnetic radiation, if the tower is within the parameters
set by the agency.
Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission has placed
procedural restrictions on municipal authority to license cable
systems. The Communications Act of 1934176 prevents a cable
provider from installing or operating a cable system within a city
without a license from the local franchising authority (usually a
subdivision of the municipal government).177 This requirement allows

172. Ostrow, supra note 71, at 290.
173. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
174. See Ostrow, supra note 71, at 292–93.
175. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)–(C) (2012).
176. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (2012)
177. Some states, such as California and Texas, were wary of the potential
for municipal abuse of the franchising process and therefore provide an
alternative for cable companies to receive statewide franchises. The
Communications Act allows the states the flexibility to determine what
the local franchising authority should be for a given market. See
generally Thomas Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises as Barriers to Video
Competition, 12 Va. J.L. & Tech. 2, 6 (2007) (“Proposed national
legislation would substantially restrict a local government’s ability to
regulate competitive cable operators while several state legislatures are
considering issuing statewide cable franchises to phone carriers.”).
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local entities to monitor the cable company’s installation of a network
into the public right-of-way, so as to minimize the disruption that this
construction would have on municipal operations. But the
Commission found that local franchising authorities sometimes abused
the franchise process, by delaying or denying new entrants178 and by
attaching conditions that had very little to do with providing cable,
such as requiring AT&T to provide free wireless telephone service to
city employees or fund construction of a community swimming pool.
The Commission found that these abuses of the local licensing process
had national consequences by making it harder for telephone
companies, which sought to enter the cable market, to build the
economies of scale necessary to compete against entrenched cable
incumbents. As a result, the Commission enacted rules limiting the
local government’s ability to abuse the franchising process, including
a shot clock for applications, limits on reasons a franchise may be
rejected, and restraints on the types and amounts of conditions that a
franchising authority can place on approvals.179
The federal government can similarly adopt very narrow general
guidelines that would limit the potential for abuse of the siting
process and force state and local officials to consider the regional
benefits of a project. Ostrow recommends a bundle of guidelines that
read almost as an Administrative Procedures Act for local siting
authority. These include a “shot clock” that requires the local
authority to issue a decision within a certain number of days after the
application is filed. The guidelines would also require that any
decision be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
record and that the decision be subject to judicial review in federal
court (which is more likely than state courts to be independent of the
parochial interests that would otherwise jeopardize the project).180
Together, these guidelines help provide some regularity to the process
and force the decision maker to justify his or her decision to a neutral
magistrate.
In addition to these recommendations, the guidelines might
require that the decision maker take into consideration the regional
environmental benefits that would be gained from the project. This
substantive requirement would effectively force the local decision
maker into more of a regional role and correct some of the
178. Because the city received a percentage of cable sales as a franchise tax,
it had incentives to preserve an incumbent monopolist’s market power
and thus maximize its own tax revenue.
179. Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 as amended, 22 FCC Rcd. 5101 (2007). See generally
Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008)
(upholding Commission rules against challenge to statutory authority).
180. Ostrow, supra note 71, at 330–35.
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externalities that would otherwise occur from the fact that renewable
energy often displays concentrated costs and dispersed benefits.
Furthermore, the guidelines might prohibit certain grounds for denial,
such as denying a wind turbine on noise pollution grounds if the
turbine is within federal noise limits. Like the electromagnetic limits
in cell tower siting cases, this prevents entities from seizing upon
spurious excuses to deny an unpopular project or denying the project
because of unreasonable cost concerns.
B.

Electricity Transmission
1.

Grid Stability

The dynamics of the transmission market are quite different than
the market for generation. The transmission grid is the interstate
highway system of the electricity industry and carries an increasing
amount of electricity across state lines, especially renewable energy.
As a result, many of the key regulatory questions regarding
transmission operations are regional in scope. These questions include:
What policies will maximize the likelihood that the total amount of
electricity dispatched to the grid at any given time is sufficient to
meet aggregate electricity demand? Do we need an independent
system operator to manage transmission capacity? How should
wholesale power sales be regulated? How should the costs of new
transmission lines be allocated among beneficiaries? Regulators’
answers to these questions have effects that reach across state lines.
When policies promote better grid management, the benefits flow to
customers throughout the region. And when grid management fails,
the costs are borne by customers across state lines—as they were
when the 2003 blackout interrupted electrical power for a long period
of time throughout the Eastern Seaboard. Because the challenges of
grid management are regional in scope, they are best answered by a
more significant regional entity.
Fortunately, the industry has already achieved a significant
amount of regional cooperation through bottom-up coordination
structures known as Independent System Operators (ISOs) and
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). When FERC
mandated that utilities offer their transmission lines on a
nondiscriminatory basis to independent power generators in 1996, it
adopted a series of orders encouraging utilities to band together to
form ISOs and RTOs.181 ISOs and RTOs are separate, nonprofit
181. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 21, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385);
Regional Transmission Organizations, FERC Order 2000, 89 FERC ¶
61,285 (1999) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (promoting the
formation of RTOs).
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entities charged with managing the transmission system on behalf of
its member utilities. Utilities participating in these transmission
organizations retain ownership of their transmission lines, but
surrender daily operation of those lines to the organization.182 The
ostensible purpose of this requirement is to prevent utilities from
using their control of transmission facilities to stifle competition in the
generation market. But the organization brings the added benefit of
building economies of scale in the transmission market: because the
organization controls the flow of electricity over a larger portion of
the grid, it can smooth out supply or demand variations over a
larger footprint.
Today, there are six independent entities under FERC
jurisdiction, each of which manage a portion of the transmission grid:
the California ISO, the Midwest ISO, ISO New England, the New
York ISO, the PJM Interconnection, and the Southwest Power Pool
RTO.183 ERCOT performs a similar function in Texas, independently
of FERC oversight.184 Notably, not all areas of the country are
covered by these entities; many western and southern utilities have
resisted turning over the management of their transmission systems to
an independent operator and instead remain governed by tariffs filed
with the Commission. In western states, however, many of these
utilities cooperate on a less formal basis through participation in the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council or the Western Area Power
Administration.185

182. Kaplan, supra note 84, at 7.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 6.
185. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1848–49.
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Figure 2186

Although they are non-governmental entities formed by the
utilities rather than by state or local government officials, these
regional transmission organizations exhibit many of the benefits of
cooperative federalism. They are, by definition, bottom-up
organizations, formed by voluntary agreements between utilities and
therefore operate in a geographic area no larger or smaller than
necessary to manage grid stability for its member utilities. Because
each organization manages the grid on behalf of its members, its
operations leverage local knowledge about transmission capacity,
generation capacity, and demand in real-time. This allows each
organization to balance supply and demand efficiently.
Moreover, over the past fifteen years ISOs and RTOs have
worked with federal and state officials to experiment with different
ways of managing the transition to more deregulated wholesale
markets. California’s energy crisis was an obvious disaster, but its
high-profile struggles have overshadowed more successful transitions
in other regions, such as PJM.187 And even the California experiment
186. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, http://www.ferc.gov/marketoversight/mkt-electric/overview/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf (last visited Sept.
3, 2014).
187. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 451, 468–79 (2005).
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yielded valuable lessons for other markets. The decentralized, bottomup structure of grid operations has helped regulators and industry
participants explore many potential market structures within the
confines of broad federal mandates.
2.

Transmission Line Planning and Siting

Planning and siting future transmission lines to bring renewable
energy to market is also best done through a more formal regional
structure. Decision makers must identify current pockets of congestion
and forecast both demand growth and areas where renewable capacity
growth is most likely to occur. With increasing diversification of the
generation industry generally and the growth of the renewable sector
specifically, an increasing amount of electricity is, and will be,
transported between points in different states. Like grid operation,
planning and siting requires a regional focus on the wholesale
electricity market that state regulators are often unwilling or unable
to consider.
Moreover, the planning process for new transmission capacity and
the siting of specific transmission lines should work in tandem. As Jim
Rossi has explained, states, such as Texas, that have focused on
reforming their transmission siting regimes have had the most success
in achieving their RPS goals.188 As part of its 2005 revision to its
renewable portfolio standards requirement, Texas designated five
areas, mostly in the western part of the state, as “Competitive
Renewables Energy Zones” (CREZs) with sufficient potential for
large-scale development of renewable energy. The legislation also
developed a plan to build new transmission capacity from CREZ areas
to bring that new energy into the Texas grid.189 The Texas Public
Utilities Commission engaged in a comprehensive process to assess the
CREZ areas, plan and site new lines, and determine how the lines’
costs will be allocated to consumers. As a result, Texas achieved its
2025 wind energy target of 10,000 megawatts of renewable energy
capacity on the Texas grid fifteen years ahead of schedule.190
Outside of Texas, there are many efforts to engage in regional
transmission planning. The RTOs have long been a place for member
utilities to forecast and plan new capacity. And outside the six
188. Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National
Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 361, 377
(2011).
189. Mark Dreyfus, Texas CREZ Policy and Transmission
Expansion Update 5 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.
austinenergy.com/about%20us/newsroom/Reports/keyAccountsCREZ_
TSAR.pdf.
190. What are the Texas Renewable Energy Targets?, StateImpact,
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/texas-renewable-energy-targets/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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ISO/RTO areas, there has been substantial bottom-up regional
planning as well, including efforts focused specifically on the need for
new transmission capacity for renewable energy. Noteworthy in this
respect is the Western Renewable Energy Zones initiative in 2008, a
project funded by the Department of Energy but led by the Western
Governors’ Association to study and plan for future renewable
transmission capacity.191 In 2011 FERC issued Order 1000,
which among other initiatives required all utilities to engage in
regional transmission planning and ultimately produce a regional
transmission plan.192
But siting authority remains decoupled from transmission
planning and located primarily at the state or local level, which
remains a stumbling block to new transmission construction. As noted
above, state and local regulators lack incentives to assess the full
benefits and costs of many transmission lines, particularly interstate
lines. Congress attempted to solve this problem by granting FERC
backstop siting authority as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.193
The Act requires the Department of Energy to undertake a triennial
study of electric transmission congestion and “designate any
geographic area experiencing electric energy transmission capacity
constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers as a
national interest electric transmission corridor” (NIETC)194 Once an
area is designated as an NIETC, the Act gives FERC “backstop”
siting authority to override state barriers to new transmission
construction.195 To exercise this authority, FERC must determine
that: (1) the state does not have authority to approve siting of
facilities or to consider the interstate benefits of the project; (2) the
utility does not qualify for state approval because it does not serve
end-user customers in the state; (3) the state has authority to approve
the siting but has withheld approval for more than a year; or (4) the
state has approved the project with such conditions as to not
significantly reduce interstate transmission congestion or to make the
project economically infeasible.196

191. See Western Renewable Energy Zones, W. Governors’ Ass’n,
http://www.westgov.org/rtep/219 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (providing
an overview of the Western Renewable Energy Zones initiative).
192. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities, FERC Order 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051
(2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
193. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221(b), 119 Stat. 947 (2005) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 824p(a)–(b) (2012)).
194. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2)
195. § 824p(b).
196. Id.
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But thus far, courts have largely hamstrung the agencies’ efforts
to exercise this authority. In 2007, the Department of Energy
designated the first two NIETCs under the Act: one in the southwest
running from Arizona to California and one in the Mid-Atlantic
between New York and Washington, DC.197 But the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals invalidated these designations in 2011, in part
because the agency failed to adequately consult with the affected
states.198 Meanwhile, FERC promulgated regulations interpreting its
siting authority broadly, to include instances in which states deny
siting permits. But the Fourth Circuit invalidated this rule, rejecting
FERC’s argument that a denial constitutes the “with[olding] [of]
approval . . . for more than a year.”199 The court explained that the
agency’s backstop authority extended to delayed or conditional
approvals but not to explicit denials of siting applications.
Interestingly, the 2005 Act also authorized three or more states to
enter an interstate compact to establish a regional siting agency.200 To
incentivize states to enter such agreements, the Act prohibits FERC
generally from exercising its backstop authority to permit a line in a
state that is a part of a compact.201 But perhaps because neither the
Department of Energy nor FERC has yet exercised its authority
under the Act in a way that has undermined state siting authority, no
states have entered into a compact.202
Going forward, the solution to the transmission dilemma requires
a more successful integration of transmission planning and siting at
the regional level. It is difficult for RTOs and other voluntary
planning organizations to integrate siting into their portfolio, because
as non-state actors they largely lack eminent domain authority.
Ideally, this impetus would come from state compacts such as those
envisioned in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which would effectively
create bottom-up regional governance structures with the planning
and siting authority to plan comprehensive future transmission
projects. But as the Act shows, sates are unlikely to do so without
some impetus. One solution may be for Congress to grant federal
197. National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992
(Oct. 5, 2007).
198. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2011). The Court also found that the department failed to satisfy
certain requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. Id. at
1096–106.
199. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d
304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009).
200. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 1221(i), 119 Stat. 950–51
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §824q(i) (2012)).
201. § 1221(i)(4).
202. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1819–20.
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eminent domain to any regional planning organization under Order
1000, but to exempt from this order any state that voluntarily enters
into a compact that includes planning and siting. This approach may
jumpstart state government initiatives to cooperate in the promotion
of future transmission capacity, because a state’s failure to do so risks
the specter of federally chartered regional planning organizations
riding roughshod over local opposition to new transmission capacity.
C.

Renewable Portfolio Standards

As detailed at length above, state public utility commissions have
largely driven greater demand for renewable energy, primarily through
renewable portfolio standards that require utilities to purchase a
certain percentage of their electricity for distribution from renewable
sources. The Waxman-Markey Bill raised the question whether the
federal government should set a national minimum renewable
portfolio standard. Although the bill did not pass, the idea of a
federal RPS has been repeatedly introduced in Congress203 and has
received significant attention from academics and policymakers.204
Advocates cite several reasons to support a federal renewable
portfolio standard. Many of these simply mirror arguments made at
the state level: renewable energy may reduce air pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions, save on long-term energy costs, and
increase American energy interdependence.205 These are arguments to
support renewable energy generally, but do not address the specific
question of why the federal government is in the best position to do
so. Addressing the jurisdictional question more directly, Lincoln
Davies asserts that a national standard would make the renewable
energy market “more liquid, transparent, and uniform” by setting a
single nationwide definition for what counts as a renewable
resource.206 Because the different states have different RPS criteria,
investors may be apprehensive about making long-term investments
in renewable generation, and those investments they do make could
be driven more by state political preferences than the product’s
“salient economic features.”207 Moreover, a national standard would

203. Davies, supra note 64, at 1364–65.
204. See, e.g., id. at 1365; Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing
Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the
U.S. Energy Industry, 29 Energy L.J. 49 (2008); Rossi, supra note 188
(arguing against a national portfolio standard); Mary Ann Ralls,
Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 27 Energy L.J. 451 (2006) (same).
205. Davies, supra note 64, at 1370–75.
206. Id. at 1366.
207. Id.
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“eliminate jurisdictional problems” of state standards that give
preferential treatment to in-state resources.
In response, Jim Rossi notes that the environmental case for
renewable energy is not as clear as proponents suggest.208 The need to
rely on inefficiently running fossil-fuel power plants to back up
intermittent renewable generation detracts from the environmental
benefits of renewable electricity production.209 And given the decline
in natural gas prices, investments in renewable energy likely replace
investments in relatively low-emission natural gas plants, not in
dirtier coal power plants. Moreover, Rossi notes that because most
states already have RPS standards, the costs of a federal mandate
would fall disproportionately on the handful of states that have not
already done so.210 It seems problematic to adopt a federal mandate
for which costs fall primarily upon those few whose state-level policy
choices reflect opposition to that mandate.
Ultimately, the state’s choice whether to adopt an RPS standard
is essentially a question whether end-user customers are willing to pay
an additional cost for (potentially) cleaner energy. That will remain
true as long as renewable energy remains more expensive than fossil
fuel energy. The answer to this question depends on precisely how
much more the consumer must pay for renewable generation—and
that question varies by state. In states like Texas, where wind and
solar resources are abundant, the difference between the price of
renewable energy and conventional energy is relatively small. By
comparison, a state like West Virginia, which has little renewable
energy capacity but abundant coal reserves, the price differential is
much greater. The decision whether to subject consumers to an RPS
surcharge, therefore, turns on local knowledge about market
conditions that states, not the federal government, are in the best
position to assess.
Moreover, given the relatively immature state of the renewable
energy generation market, state-level experimentation with different
renewable sources is likely a net benefit to society. Far from being a
problem, the lack of uniformity among state RPS qualifications
represents Justice Brandeis’s “laboratories of democracy” in action.211
Different state standards are encouraging investors to test a wide
range of alternatives. Some renewable resources, such as geothermal
or tidal energy, may be uneconomical on a national scale but may
prove to be viable in certain areas. A national standard established

208. Rossi, supra note 188, at 364–66.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 366.
211. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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without the benefit of empirical results at the state level may
prematurely reject these borderline viable sources of energy. Justice
Brandeis’s ode to federalism is most famous for its optimistic view of
the states, but equally important is his opinion’s warning about the
risks of premature preemption: “[t]o stay experimentation in things
social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation.”212
One may object that state-level RPS standards underinvest in
renewable technology. Assuming that there are environmental benefits
to switching to renewable energy, these positive externalities are
enjoyed nationwide—which may lead some states to free-ride on the
investments of others. But if the federal government decides that
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is in the national interest, it has
other means of doing so.
For example, the federal government may choose to adopt a
carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program similar to that proposed in
Waxman-Markey. These initiatives would directly reduce greenhouse
gases. They may also indirectly stimulate greater renewable energy
production, because they would raise the price of fossil fuel-generated
electricity and therefore make renewable electricity relatively
less expensive.
Alternatively, the federal government could provide for greater
funding for renewable energy research and subsidies for new
construction of renewable energy. From PURPA forward, Congress
has funded basic research into the feasibility of renewable technologies
and provided tax credits and other subsidies for new renewable
generation facilities. In 1992 Congress established a renewable energy
production tax credit, which gave companies tax credits for each
kilowatt hour for electricity produced by wind power.213 The same act
created the Renewable Energy Production Initiative, which gives
federal incentive payments for electricity generated and sold in the
wholesale market by new qualifying renewable energy sources.214
212. Id. at 311.
213. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Although the original Production Tax Credit
expired in July 1999, Congress reauthorized the credit numerous times,
including in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. See Job Creation and
Worker Assistance Act, Pub. L. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 (2002)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)); American Jobs Creation Act, Pub.
L. 108-357, § 710, 118 Stat. 1418, 1552 (2004) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §45
(2012)); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 202, 119 Stat. 594,
651 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2012)). The fiscal cliff deal at the
end of 2012 extended the production tax credit through the end of 2013.
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, § 407, 126 Stat.
2313, 2340 (2013) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)).
214. Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2012). The REPI is
currently scheduled to sunset in October 2016. § 13317(c) (2012).
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Congress has also regularly funded research into various renewable
energy technologies, including setting aside $1.64 billion toward
research and development of renewable energy technologies as part of
the 2009 stimulus bill.215
As David Spence has noted, “[m]any analysts ascribe [much] of
the credit for the growth in renewables to federal tax incentives.”216
They help incentivize initial investment in renewable technologies.
Given the significant fixed cost and relatively small marginal cost of
most renewable energy production, these initial investment decisions
go far toward making renewable energy a more cost-efficient
alternative to traditional energy generation. And credits for renewable
energy production help reduce the per-megawatt hour price of
wholesale electricity—occasionally to the point that wind generators
actually paid utilities to take wind electricity, so as to receive the
production tax credit.217 Many have shown that the boom-and-bust
cycle of federal production incentives has had a significant impact on
overall investment in renewable facilities.218

Conclusion
State and local officials have played a significant role throughout
the electricity industry’s history. The deregulation of electricity
generation, and the rise of renewable energy as an alternative to
traditional fossil fuels, has increased the complexity of the industry.
Going forward, a substantial portion of electricity sales are likely to
be interstate, particularly given the need to move renewable energy
from resource-rich middle America to electricity-hungry load centers
on the coasts. For the renewable power sector, states have played a
schizophrenic role as both accelerator and brake on industry growth,
boosting demand for renewable energy while at the same time
blocking the infrastructure that would bring it to market.
Federal preemption is a tempting solution to the obstacles posed
by state and local officials. But succumbing to this temptation would
sacrifice the valid interests that these officials maintain in renewable
energy policy decisions, and fails to acknowledge the risks of vesting
decision-making authority at too high a level.
215. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5,
123 Stat. 116 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
216. Spence, supra note 9, at 283.
217. See Ctr. for Energy Econ., Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Lessons
Learned from Renewable Energy Credit (REC) Trading in
Texas
20
(2009),
http://
www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/
transmission_forum/CEE_Texas_RPS_Study.pdf (noting that wind
generators, which needed wind power to be dispatched to collect
production tax credits, submitted negative bids in certain hours).
218. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 9, at 283.
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Ultimately, the challenges posed by renewable energy are regional
in scope and require decision makers with a regional focus to respond.
A bottom-up regional approach to policy questions, vesting authority
in state and local actors guided toward regional coordination by
federal prodding, is preferable to a top-down regional approach
dominated by federal decision makers. Ultimately, a state-centered
approach helps preserve the diversity that is a hallmark of our
Federalism. In a market as diverse, young, and dynamic as renewable
energy, these federalism values can help develop innovative new
solutions to policy problems and discover the optimal regulatory
scheme, or schemes, to realize renewable energy’s full potential.
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